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Abstract
Five physical assumptions are proposed that together entail the general qualitative
results, including the Born rule, of non-relativistic quantummechanics by physical and
information-theoretic reasoning alone. Two of these assumptions concern fundamental
symmetries of physical interactions. The third concerns the Hilbert-space dimensions
and the fourth and fifth the self-interaction Hamiltonians of the systems that function
as “observers” within the theory. These assumptions are shown to provide a sufficient
motivation for the usual Hilbert-space formalism, and to obviate the observation-
related axioms and most interpretative assumptions with which minimal quantum
mechanics is typically supplemented.
Keywords: Observation, Quantum foundations, Measurement problem, Born rule, Deco-
herence, Automata
1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics is traditionally presented as an abstract mathematical theory, the
correctness of which is evident from over a century of experimentation, but not obvious from
its fundamental assumptions. One of the primary reasons for this non-obviousness is that it
is not clear from the fundamental assumptions what the theory is about; in particular, it is
not clear to what the fundamental concept of the state vector refers, and it is not clear how
classical information is extracted from quantum systems by measurement. A wide variety
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of interpretative additions to the theory have been proposed to address these questions (for
reviews see [1, 2, 3]), but none have proven sufficiently satisfactory to gain wide acceptance.
While the dominant response of both the research community and pedagogy to questions of
interpretation has been to “shut up and calculate”, an alternative foundation for quantum
mechanics involving clear physical principles that motivate the choice of the Hilbert-space
formalism in the way that classical mechanics motivates Lagrangians and Hamiltonians has
remained a goal [4].
The present paper offers five physical assumptions from which the most general conse-
quences of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, including information loss due to deco-
herence, non-commuting observables represented as POVMs, and the Born rule can be
derived by physical and information-theoretic reasoning with a minimaum of formalism.
Like the mathematical assumptions of traditional, formal presentations of quantum me-
chanics (henceforth “TFQM”), these assumptions supplement a pre-theoretic assumption
that the universe consists of degrees of freedom that interact in space and time. The five
assumptions are:
1. Time symmetry: Physical interactions do not depend on the direction of time.
2. Decompositional equivalence: Physical interactions do not depend on the specifica-
tion of boundaries that decompose the universe into systems.
3. Small observers: The number of degrees of freedom contained within any observer is
much smaller than the number of degrees of freedom of that observer’s environment.
4. Reliable memory: The memories of observers are reliable enough to be considered
classical.
5. Shared observables: Observers share observables and hence can confirm or disconfirm
each others’ observations.
The first two of these assumptions concern fundamental symmetries of physical interactions.
The last three concern the information-coding capacities (corresponding to Hilbert-space
dimensions) and functional architectures (corresponding to self-interaction Hamiltonians)
of finite physical systems that function as “observers” within the theory. This emphasis
on the observer may seem surprising, as with the notable exception of the “many minds”
interpretation [5] TFQM generally attributes no particular internal structure to observers,
and in some formulations (e.g. [6]) does without them altogether. As will be shown below,
however, these assumptions have significant and precise physical consequences, and obviate
many of the interpretative assumptions with which TFQM is commonly supplemented,
including those associated with “collapse”, “branching”, and einselection.
In what follows, these assumptions are first presented and motivated, and their relationship
to common assumptions or conclusions of TFQM examined. It is shown that they allow an
unambiguous definition of “observation” as a classical task, and that this definition together
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with classical automata theory allows an unambiguous definition of a minimal observer. A
natural definition of quantum-mechanical observables as well-defined POVMs follows, as do
standard results concerning commutativity. It is shown that observations employing these
POVMs yield results in accordance with the Born rule. The given assumptions provide a
physical motivation, therefore, for the usual Hilbert-space formalism of TFQM, with inter-
actions described as Hamiltonians. It is shown that the given assumptions largely obviate
the additional axioms and interpretational constructs with which TFQM has traditionally
been supplemented.
2 Five physical assumptions
2.1 Time symmetry
It is assumed that all physical interactions are time-symmetric. Hence any configuration of
degrees of freedom that can be created by physical dynamics can be destroyed by physical
dynamics, and vice versa. In a universe in which configurations of degrees of freedom
change, therefore, no configuration can be assumed to be permanent. Time symmetry is
enforced in TFQM by the assumption of a unitary propagator; its assumption is, therefore,
fully consistent with traditional presentations.
2.2 Decompositional equivalence
It is assumed that physical interactions do not depend on the specification of boundaries
that divide collections of degrees of freedom into “systems”. All divisions of the universe
into systems are, therefore, entirely arbitrary.
While the de facto practice of physics has always assumed the freedom to select as the
“system of interest” any collection of degrees of freedom whatever, the assumption of de-
compositional equivalence presents a prima facie conflict with TFQM. The dependence of
TFQM on a non-arbitrary division of the universe into systems has been emphasized by
Zurek, who states “a compelling explanation of what the systems are - how to define them
given, say, the overall Hamiltonian in some suitably large Hilbert space - would undoubtedly
be most useful” ([7], p. 1818) and in the absence of such a definition adopts as “axiom(o)”
of quantum mechanics that “[T]he Universe consists of systems,” pointing out that without
this additional axiom, “questions about outcomes cannot be even posed” ([8], p. 3; see
also [2, 9]). It is shown below that this conflict between practice and theory results from
implicit assumptions of most interpretations of TFQM regarding observers, and that with
a consistent treatment of observers “axiom(o)” is unnecessary.
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2.3 Small observers
It is assumed that the configurations of degrees of freedom that function as “observers”
within the theory are small with respect to their environments. In particular, it is assumed
that the classical information coding capacity of any observer is much smaller than the
classical coding capacity of that observer’s environment.
The assumption of decompositional equivalence prevents the specification of observer - en-
vironment boundaries and hence interactions from first principles; observers can, therefore,
only be specified ad hoc. For the purposes of the theory, an “observer” is defined as any
system capable of carrying out the task of observation as characterized in detail below.
As will be shown, typical laboratory data collection systems running on typical laboratory
computers satisfy this definition of an observer.
While they make no specific assumptions regarding the internal structures of observers
other than that they can “readily consult the content of their memory” ([9], p. 759), the
“environment as witness” [10, 11] and quantum Darwinism [8, 12, 13] programs assume that
observers are much smaller than their environments. As will be seen below, the qualitative
“picture” of observation derived from the present assumptions is very similar to that of
quantum Darwinism, although the specific assumptions of quantum Darwinism, including
einselection, are not required.
2.4 Reliable memories
It is assumed that observers have memories that can be considered classical. As will be
shown below, this assumption is required to define the task of observation.
The assumption of reliable memory introduces a second prima facie conflict with TFQM.
Interpretations of TFQM in the von Neumann - Everett tradition characterize the observer
as a quantum system, the final state of which is determined by entanglement with the
system observed as represented by the von Neumann chain:
(
∑
k
λk|sk〉)|A
i〉|Or〉 →
∑
k
λk |sk〉|ak〉|ok〉 → |sf 〉|af 〉|of 〉 (1)
where |Ai〉 and |Or〉 refer to the unmeasured initial state of an apparatus A and “ready”
state of the observer O, the microscopic quantum system being observed is described by
basis vectors |sk〉, and |sf〉|af〉|of〉 is the joint final state. Quantum systems cannot be
cloned [14], so the final observer state |of〉 cannot serve as a recallable memory state. This
issue is often finessed (e.g. Wigner’s friend does not question Wigner’s memory), but it can
only be eliminated by either eliminating observers altogether (e.g. [6]) or invoking deco-
herence either at the observer-environment boundary (e.g. [9]) or internal to the observer
(e.g. [15]).
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2.5 Shared observables
It is assumed that observers share observables, i.e. that they can observe the “same things.”
Such an assumption is required for observations to be confirmable or disconfirmable, and
hence for science to be possible.
Observables are defined independently of observers in most interpretations of TFQM, so
the question of whether they are shared does not arise. However, if quantum states are
interpreted as purely subjective, i.e. as descriptions of observers’ beliefs or knowledge (e.g.
[4]), the question of whether observations are confirmable is typically unresolved.
3 Minimal observers
This section first characterizes observation as a task in classical terms. It then employs
classical automata theory to define the minimal classical observer capable of carrying out
this task. The classical assumptions are then relaxed, and it is shown that the functional
architecture of the minimal observer is alone sufficient to enforce compliance with LOCC.
The section closes by deriving an observer-relative analog of the no-cloning theorem of
TFQM.
Consider a laboratory environment containing N discrete, macroscopic items of apparatus
Ai , each of which has a macroscopic “read-out” component Ri comprising, for example, a
finite collection gauges or displays. Any read-out Ri is capable of indicating any one of k
blocks of classical information that can be regarded, without loss of generality, as encoded
by k finite-precision real values rik. An observer is any finite physical system capable of
1) reliably re-identifying each of the Ai across an extended period of time during which
each of the Ai undergo multiple state transitions; 2) reliably re-identifying each of the Ri
across multiple state transitions of the relevant Ai and reliably recording its value rik on
each observation; 3) reliably reporting the accumulated results as a sequence of values rik,
each tagged by its source, at the end of the observing session. Assuming that an observer O
begins each observation in a “ready” state |Or 〉, the task of observation can be summarized
by the functional decomposition shown in Fig. 1.
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✛|Or〉
❄
observing? ✲
No
❄
A1 signal?
No
b
b
b
❄
AN signal? b✲
No
Report records
❄
Flush records
b✲
❄
Extract R1
❄
Record R1
b
b
b
❄
Extract RN
❄
Record RN
b✲
Fig. 1: Functional decomposition of multiple-observation task
Intuitively, any observer capable of carrying out the task shown in Fig. 1 must know how to
identify the Ai and know how to extract the values rik from the Ri . These intuitions about
the prior knowledge of observers are formalized by classical automata theory. Suppose O
interacts with the Ai by looking at them, i.e. by means of scattered ambient photons. The
state of the environment E shared by O and the Ai then serves as a classical communication
channel. Represent the signals transmitted along this channel as a sequence of classical bits,
and assume that O receives these bits without noise or overlap. The observation task then
consists of 1) identifying the bit strings that encode well-formed messages from each source
Ai ; 2) extracting the component of each of these well-formed bit strings that encodes
the read-out value rik; 3) writing these read-out values to memory, tagged by source. A
well-formed message clearly cannot consist only of a read-out value (e.g. “2”), as it must
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also include bits that identify the source. Classical automata theory demonstrates that O
cannot define, from any finite sample of input from E , either the bit patterns that distinguish
messages by source or which bits within each message encode the read-out values rik to be
recorded, even if O is permitted finite diagnostic inputs to the Ai [16]. If O cannot infer
the rules necessary to recognize the Ai or extract the rik from a finite sample of the input
stream, O must encode them in advance. As these signal-source recognition and read-out
value extraction rules are needed on every cycle of observation, they must be encoded in
O’s ready state |Or〉. This encoding must, moreover, be reliable; hence the assumption
that observers have reliable memories is required to define the observation task.
Successful completion of the observation task requires not just identification of the Ai
and extraction of the rik, it requires doing so on multiple cycles, and then reporting the
accumulated results. For a fixed, finite set of Ai and a fixed number of observation cyles, a
classical finite-state machine with a fixed memory will meet these requirements. However,
a general observer capable of carrying out the task of Fig. 1 for any observation period
and any possible finite set of Ai cannot be assumed to pre-allocate memory for all possible
observation periods or to encode recognizers for all possible Ai ; such an observer must,
therefore, incorporate a dynamically-allocatable memory and a capability to acquire and
store specifications for recognizers of new Ai not previously encountered. These capabilities
require an architecture functionally equivalent to a classical Turing Machine.
A classical minimal observer is a finite physical system capable of performing the task
summarized in Fig. 1 for arbitrary finite observation times and any specified finite set
of Ai . The above considerations show that a classical minimal observer must implement
a Turing-equivalent functional architecture and must encode signal-source recognizers for
the Ai and read-out value extractors for the rik in its ready state |O
r〉. Classical minimal
observers are commonplace; any laboratory data-collection system running on a general-
purpose computer is a classical minimal observer.
Having defined a classical minimal observer, the assumptions employed to describe the
observation task in classical terms can be relaxed. Three assumptions are involved. First,
the signals transmitted through E were assumed to be strings of discrete bits, received in
the absence of noise and without overlap. This assumption conflicts with the intuitions
that physical dynamics are continuous and environments are noisy; hence it is relaxed
to an assumption of arbitrary continuous input to O from E . Second, the apparatus Ai
were assumed to be discrete entities, and it was implicitly assumed that only signals from
the Ai were transmitted through E . By treating the boundaries of the Ai as “real”, this
assumption straightforwardly conflicts with decompositional equivalence. It is therefore
relaxed to an assumption consistent with decompositional equivalence, namely that signals
from all possible collections of degrees of freedom, including all single degrees of freedom,
are simultaneously propagated through E . Third, it was implicitly assumed that the O − E
boundary and hence the O − E interaction were well-defined. This assumption also conflicts
with decompositional equivalence. To maintain consistency, an ad hoc O − E boundary
that is small enough to comply with the assumption of small observers but large enough
to contain the degrees of freedom that implement O’s functional architecture is assumed;
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such a boundary can be drawn, for example, at the visible surface of O. This ad hoc
boundary allows the definition of an ad hoc O − E interaction, which will be denoted
HO−E in anticipation of the adoption of a state representation in which interactions can
be represented by Hamiltonians. It also allows the definition of a self interaction HO−O.
As the definition of observation involves the assumption that O continues to exist as an
identifiable entity, the ad hoc interactions HO−E and HO−O must at least approximately
commute.
The task of observation can now be described using these relaxed assumptions. The ad hoc
observer O interacts via HO−E with E . The environment E encodes in its continuous dy-
namics signals from all possible collections of degrees of freedom, including those previously
but no longer singled out and labeled as the Ai . The task of O is to interact with E over an
extended period of time, and at the end of that period to report a set of source-tagged real
values rik indicating the states of the no longer specified read-outs Ri . As before, O is ca-
pable of completing this task if, but only if, O implements a Turing-equivalent architecture
with reliable memory, and encodes in |Or〉 executable specifications of the signal-source
recognizers required to identify signals from the Ai and the read-out extractors required
to extract the rik. None of the functional requirements on O change as a result of the
re-description of observation with these relaxed assumptions, because nothing about the
physical situation with which O is faced changes as a result of the re-description. Only the
information included in the theory changes; the information and architecture that O must
possess to perform the task of observation while immersed in E do not. A classical minimal
observer is, therefore, a minimal observer under the relaxed conditions. This result can be
formalized as a theorem:
Theorem (Enforced LOCC): Ad hoc specification of a minimal observer by itself enforces
LOCC.
Proof: A minimal observer O interacts directly only with the environment E , and only at
the specified ad hoc O − E boundary. Hence all observations are local. A minimal observer
requires a memory reliable enough to be considered classical. Minimal observers are finite
physical systems, so this classical memory can encode at most a finite number i of executable
specifications of signal-source recognizers and a finite number k of executable specifications
of extractors of finite-precision values rik from each signal source. Communication from
any signal source to O is therefore effectively classical. 
The assumption of small observers entails a further result that, as will be shown below,
renders observations by minimal observers consistent with the predictions of TFQM.
Theorem (No Replication): A minimal observer cannot replicate the initial conditions of
E .
Proof: Minimal observers have fewer degrees of freedom than their environments, so the
coding capacities of their memories are smaller than the coding capacities of their environ-
ments. Therefore, a minimal observer O cannot fully represent any state of E in memory,
and in particular cannot fully represent the initial state |E i〉 that begins any cycle of ob-
servation. Therefore O cannot recognize any initial state |E i〉. 
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No Replication is an observer-relative analog of the no-cloning theorem of TFQM; it implies
that even if an environmental state could be cloned, no observer could recognize it as cloned.
4 Observables and the Born rule for minimal observers
Let {Pi} denote the set of signal-source recognizers and {Rik} denote the set of read-out
value extractors implemented by a minimal observer O. These functions are implemented
by the self-interaction HO−O in the sense defined by classical computer science: from given
initial states |Or〉 and |E i〉, particular, sequential changes in the configurations of degrees of
freedom of O can be mapped to sequential abstract steps in the execution of an algorithm
specifying one of the Pi, and further particular, sequential changes in the configurations
of degrees of freedom of O can be mapped to sequential abstract steps in the execution of
an algorithm specifying one of the Rik (e.g. [17]). The notations “Pi” and “Rik” will be
employed below to refer either to the abstract recognizers or extractors or to their physical
implementations by HO−O as determined by context.
As shown in Fig. 1, the Rik are effectively orthogonal; if one of the Rik “fires” following an
input, O returns to |Or 〉 and a new cycle of observation is initiated. Moreover, O’s archite-
cure guarantees both that some Rik will return a real value rik whenever a signal source is
recognized by some Pi, and that no Rik will return a value in the case of non-recognition
(i.e., O returns to |Or〉 with no memory-write operation). Under these conditions, for any
stipulated HO−E the set {Oik}, where Oik = HO−E ◦ Pi ◦ Rik, forms an Ai -specific POVM
over states of E . The POVM {Oik} produces read-out values rik whenever Ai is recognized
by O, and is therefore an Ai -specific observable for O.
Suppose observers O(1 ) and O(2 ) implement POVMs {O
(1)
ik } and {O
(2)
ik } respectively, and
that:
∀i, k and ∀|E i〉,O
(1 )
ik |E
i〉 = O
(2 )
ik |E
i〉 = rik . (2)
In this case {O
(1)
ik } and {O
(2)
ik } are output-equivalent and O
(1 ) and O(2 ) can be said to
share a POVM {Oik}. Multiple minimal observers will agree that a collection of degrees
of freedom Ai is present in their shared environment if and only if they share a POVM
{Oik} that outputs a single set {rik} of values for the read-out states of Ai . The notion of
“objectivity” has been defined within quantum Darwinism as:
“A property of a physical system is objective when it is:
1. simultaneously accessible to many observers,
2. who are able to find out what it is without prior knowledge about the
system of interest, and
3. who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agreement.”
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(p. 1 of [10]; p. 3 of [11])
A set of minimal observers that share POVMs will agree, using this definition, that the Ai
they jointly observe are “objective” and hence effectively classical.
Suppose now that O(1 ) and O(2 ) share E and share POVMs {Oik} and {Qjl}. Suppose
O(1 ) performs observations with {Oik} and then with {Qjl}, and obtains results rik and sjl
respectively; simultaneously O(2 ) performs observations with {Qjl} and then with {Oik},
and obtains results s′jl and r
′
ik respectively. Clearly O
(1 ) and O(2 ) can obtain the same
results (i.e. rik = r
′
ik and sjl = s
′
jl) only if the systems Ai and Aj recognized by the shared
Pi and Pj encode signals in non-interacting and hence orthogonal components of E . Hence:
Theorem (Commutativity): Observables {Oik} and {Qjl} commute only if the identified
systems Ai and Aj encode signals in orthogonal components of E .
Proof: Suppose otherwise, and let X be the component of E that encodes signals from
both Ai and Aj . The POVM {Oik} is a resolution of the identity for E and is therefore
well-defined over X in the absence of Aj . The addition of Aj to E cannot, therefore, affect
the values returned by {Oik}, contradicting the supposition. 
This commutativity theorem replicates for the system- and observer-dependent observables
defined in the current framework the general commutativity result obtained for system- and
observer-independent observables in TFQM. In the current framework, however, observers
can only demonstrate commutativity of observables by cooperative experiments such as
described above, since they are forbidden by the No Replication theorem from replicating
initial states of E . As the minimum overlap between components of E encoding signals
from two distinct sources is one degree of freedom, the minimum perturbation of experi-
mental results obtained with non-commuting observables due to signal interference is the
perturbation due to altering one degree of freedom of E .
It follows trivially from the Commutativity theorem that no two observables that pick out
the same external collection of degrees of freedom Ai commute. Hence:
Theorem (Objective ignorance): Observers cannot determine the configurations of ex-
ternal degrees of freedom that yield, on observation, any given value rik.
Proof: Any such determination would require an observable {Qil} that picked out Ai and
assigned values sil to each configuration of its degrees of freedom. By the Commutatitivity
theorem, no such observable would commute with {Oik}, therefore no such {Qil} could be
used to determine which configurations of Ai yield which rik. 
The Objective Ignorance theorem provides an analog in the current framework of an earlier
result showing that observers cannot demonstrate redundant environmental encoding of
pointer states in TFQM under the assumptions of quantum Darwinism [18].
As shown by Zurek [19], provable ignorance generates the Born rule. Stripped of formalized
assumptions about how states are to be described, the Born rule states an absence of bias,
both on the part of observers and on the part of the observables employed to carry out
observations. It requires that the probability Pk with which an observer O will report the
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value rik following application of an observable {Oik} depends only on the actual fraction
F (k) of configurations of evironmental degrees of freedom that encode rik, i.e.:
Theorem (Born Rule): Pk = F (k).
In the current framework, the only source of “objectivity” is agreement among observers;
hence F (k) can at best be estimated by an objectively ignorant observer employing envari-
ance. Otherwise the proof follows that given by Zurek [19].
Proof : Let C =
⋃
Ci be an ancilla into which an observer O
(1 ) sorts configurations |ej〉 of
environmental degrees of freedom using an observable {Oik}. If {Oik}|ej〉 yields a value rik,
|ej〉 is sorted into Ck; if {Oik}|ej〉 is NULL, |ej〉 is discarded. Because O
(1 ) is objectively
ignorant, this sorting process, carried on long enough, will produce a C for which the
fractions F (k) are arbitrarily representative of their values in E . Now suppose a second
observer O(2 ) that shares {Oik} examines the configurations in C sequentially. Because
O(2 ) is objectively ignorant, O(2 )’s sequential selections of configurations cannot be biased
for k, so the probability Pk that the next configuration |ej〉 selected will be such that
{Oik}|ej〉 = rik is F (k) as required. 
5 Choice of formalism
The previous section shows that the general qualitative results of TFQM can be derived
from the five physical assumptions stated in the Introduction by physical and information-
theoretic reasoning alone, without any assumptions beyond the notion of a “configuration”
and the definition of a POVM regarding the formal descriptions of either states or operators.
What is needed in practice, however, is a formalism that permits calculation. It is therefore
reasonable to ask what mathematical assumptions would yield a formalism adequate to
the description of the physical results already obtained. Such a formalism would ideally
enforce, or at least strongly suggest, time symmetry, decompositional equivalence, and
objective ignorance of states following operations represented by POVMs.
As is well known, the formalism of minimal TFQM, without observation-related axioms
or supplementary interpretative assumptions, satisfies these criteria. Time symmetry is
enforced by a unitary propagator; additional assumptions, such as irreversible information
“loss” due to decoherence [3], must be imposed to break this time symmetry. Decompo-
sitional equivalence is enforced by linearity; additional assumptions, such as Zurek’s “ax-
iom(o)” that systems with well-defined boundaries exist [8], must be introduced to break
this symmetry. Objective ignorance on the part of observers is enforced by the concepts
of open systems and the universal state vector; additional assumptions, such as the sup-
plementary axioms that isolated systems can somehow be “prepared” or that observations
can be “repeated” are required to circumvent this ignorance.
Interposing a structured minimal observer with encoded information specifying what is
to be observed between the state vector defined by minimal TFQM and an observational
outcome, as is always the case in practice, obviates the observation-oriented axioms and
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most of the interpretative assumptions with which minimal TFQM is commonly supple-
mented. Minimal observers cannot help but identify particular external systems as sources
of signals; neither decoherence nor einselection nor additional axioms are needed to define
“systems.” Minimal observers cannot help but report discrete real values as observational
outcomes; notions of state-vector “collapse” or “branching” are unnecessary, as are the
“guiding fields” of Bohmian mechanics. No observable systems are isolated, initial states
cannot be “prepared”, and nothing assures that repeated observations will yield the same
outcome. Minimal observers agree about “objectivity” if and only if they share POVMs;
quantum Darwinism is not required to assure that they do. Minimal observers obey the
Born rule in consequence of their functional architectures; it does have to be assumed as
an axiom. Minimal observers have no more psychology than laboratory computers; no
assumptions about “consciousness,” “experience” or “belief revision” are required.
The five physical assumptions presented here, together with a representation of states as
vectors in a Hilbert space and interactions as Hamiltonians acting on such states, appear
to constitute an adequate, self-consistent, and relatively unproblematic foundation for non-
relativistic quantum mechanics. The physical assumptions are straightforward and pose no
particular challenges to intuition; the three assumptions regarding observers, in particular,
accord completely with ordinary experience. Unlike in TFQM, the assumption of the Hilbert
space formalism in this conext is well-motivated by simple physical reasoning. The proposed
foundation is not entirely free of philosophical issues; while a realist interpretation of the
environment and its state is straightforward, it is difficult to escape an observer-dependent,
constructivist view of the “objects” of ordinary experience. This philosophical issue is,
however, not unique to quantum mechanics, and seems a small price to pay for freedom from
such issues as collapsing wave functions, infinitely-branching trees of possible outcomes, or
axiomatic postulates that particular systems exist.
6 Conclusion
Since the pioneering work of von Neumann [20], the observer of a quantum state |S〉 has
been treated as a physical system that becomes entangled with |S〉. The fact that observers
report definite outcomes of experiments has, therefore, been a mystery. Explanations of this
mystery have supplemented quantum mechanics with a wide variety of additional assump-
tions, but have not questioned the fundamental premise of system - observer entanglement.
The foundational assumptions for quantum mechanics proposed here depart from this tra-
dition by treating “observer” not as the name of a system, but as a functional requirement.
An “observer” in this treatment must report a definite outcome; this is a requirement of
the task of observation. Treating observation as a functional requirement naturally leads to
the concept of a minimal observer, a concept fully formed by classical automata theory over
50 years ago. A minimal observer functions in a quantum environment exactly as would
be expected for a system with finite observational and memory resources: initial states
cannot be fully characterized, observations are restricted by commutativity requirements
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on observables, and results are reported with probabilities given by the Born rule. Minimal
observers behave, in other words, like laboratory computers or graduate students, not like
all-knowing oracles capable of perceiving mixtures between dead and living cats.
Zurek [9] proposed that the world appears “quantum” because “Hilbert space is big”;
Fuchs [4] suggests that the Hilbert-space dimension of a physical system determines its
“sensitivity to touch” and hence the “zing” it can be expected to display following an
experimental intervention. The present work shows that quantum mechanics follows from
the assumption of a big Hilbert space, without fixed boundaries to separate systems of
interest, with which a pragmatic observer with limited resources is nonetheless required to
cope.
References
[1] Styer D F Balkin M S Becker K M et al. 2002 Am J Phys 70 288
[2] Schlosshauer M 2004 Rev. Mod. Phys. 76 1267 arXiv:quant-ph/0312059v4
[3] Schlosshauer M 2007 Decoherence and the Quantum to Classical Transition. Berlin:
Springer
[4] Fuchs C 2003 J. Mod. Optics 50 987 arXiv:quant-ph/0205039v1
[5] Zeh D 2000 Found Phys Lett 13 221 arXiv:quant-ph/9908.084v3
[6] Goldstein S 1998 Phys. Today 51 42
[7] Zurek W H 1998 Phil Trans Royal Soc A 356 1793
[8] Zurek W H 2007 arXiv:quant-ph/0707.2832v1
[9] Zurek W H 2003 Rev. Mod. Phys. 75 715 arXiv:quant-ph/0105.127v3
[10] Ollivier H Poulin D Zurek W H 2004 Phys Rev Lett 93 220401 arXiv:quant-
ph/0307229v2
[11] Ollivier H Poulin D Zurek W H 2005 Phys Rev A 72 042113 arXiv:quant-ph/0408125v3
[12] Blume-Kohout R Zurek W H 2006 Phys Rev A 73 062310 arXiv:quant-ph/0505031v2
[13] Zurek W H 2009 Nat Phys 5 181 arXiv:quant-ph/0903.5082v1
[14] Wooters W Zurek W 1982 Nature 299 802
[15] Tegmark M 2000 Phys Rev E 61 4194 arXiv:quant-ph/9907009v2
[16] Moore E F 1956 In Shannon C W and McCarthy J (Eds) Automata Studies. Princeton
University Press
13
[17] Tanenbaum A S 1976 Structured Computer Organization. Prentice Hall
[18] Fields C 2010 Int J Theor Phys 49 2523 arXiv:quant-ph/1003.5136v2
[19] Zurek W H 2005 Phys. Rev. A71 052105 arXiv:quant-ph/0405161v2
[20] von Neumann J 1932 Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanische Springer
14
